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I t is essential that two questions be clearly distinguished.
How may I be certain that faith is directed toward the ultimate, as the religious man claims it to be? How may it be
known that the propositions which are made in connection
with that apprehension of faith are true ? Unless the discussion
takes into account clearly from the outset that two kinds of
questions are here being asked, nothing but confusion can
result. We must distinguish between the problem of what
constitutes evidence for the reality of the religious awareness
of God, and what for a theological statement describing or
expounding this religious awareness. For both a knowledgeclaim is made. The first claim is that knowledge of God is
valid knowledge. The second claim is that propositions which
express and interpret that knowledge are also valid. Only
confusion will result if the distinction between these two questions is unclear. We must differentiate between a certain belief
held within the circle of religious faith and that faith itself.
What are the criteria by which we judge the certainty of
these ? The problem resolves itself into two aspects therefore,
which may be expressed in the following two questions:
How may I know that my religious apprehension, my apprehension of what I call God, is valid? How may I know that
statements about the apprehension and its implications are
true statements ?
Why do such questions arise ? As to the first, it may well be
asked why if one is certain that his knowledge of God is valid,
he should be concerned with showing that it is. There might
be two reasons given for this, first, that one has doubt caused
in the mind as to a preceding so-called "unshakeable" con-
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viction, whose certainty then needs buttressing; or secondly,
that one wishes to show that that claim to know God is not an
irrational one, but on the contrary a most reasonable thing.
The presence of doubt, the need to commend his assurance in
face of that doubt, these are the pressures that lead to the
quest for the establishment of the certainty.
Where is the ultimate certainty to be found? Where doubt
is present we appeal from that which is less certain to that
which is more certain, so hoping to ground that about which
doubt has been aroused upon that about which there can be
less doubt, or it is to be preferred, no' doubt at all. If we are
sure beyond doubt that b is true, and that being true, it has a
direct relation (of some sort or other, which must indeed be
made clear for the desired result) to a, which we have come to
doubt, then we may be reassured in our knowledge of the
truth of a. For our question concerning the validity of knowledge of God, the first of the two questions we differentiated
at the outset, we may fill in the content of a and b more
specifically. Let a be religious awareness, whose validity we
have been led to doubt. Let b be the consistent explanations
made on the basis of a valid religious awareness, explanations
which have fruitful connections with scientific, moral, aesthetic
experience. We may seek the reassurance of the religious
awareness on the basis of the explanations made possible by
taking that faith as a probable hypothesis, that is to say, as in
doubt. So to seek reassurance of b we appeal from the less sure
to the more sure. To establish the certainty of awareness of
God, one can appeal to experience itself or one can appeal
away from it to some other grounds, which are considered to be
more certain than the knowledge given in experience itself.
These alternatives exhaust the possibilities. Apart from them
there remains skepticism. To that to which an appeal is made
for the reassurance of the validity of religious awareness, our
b above, we shall give the name "evidence." We appeal to
evidence from that which is lesser known than the evidence,
to the evidence which we consider better known than that
from which we make the appeal.
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Thus evidence is for the unconvinced or for the skeptical.
Of what relevance is evidence if one is convinced already! If
one does not know that watch-makers make watches one
cannot argue to the existence of a watchmaker when one
finds a watch upon the sands. If one does not know, the
argument is not convincing ($ace Paley). If one is convinced
already, how can evidence be used? Evidence is employed to
assist one to move from lesser to greater certainty; but what
if one is already as certain as it is possible to be. Does an a
priori certainty need a $osteriori evidence ? Is not the question
contradictory ?
It may be suggested at this stage that evidence is not for the
reassurance of the believer who has come to doubt, but for the
skeptic that he might come to faith, that he might be convinced
by appeal to that which he has never known by talk about
what someone else claims to know. But it may well be asked
how one can convince another of the truth of experience by
appealing to words about that experience, for words about
experience can by no means be identified with that experience.
The words of another about a conviction are not the same as
being convinced myself. Words about God are by no means to
be identified with knowing God. A transposition has taken
place. What then of the evidential nature of such words,
such transpositions of the "immediate utterances of experience" ?
Let us attempt to set forth the various possibilities of
approaching the problem of the truth-certainty of the knowledge of God. The alternatives are as follows: First, to
demonstrate the existence and (at least some of) the attributes
of God. Secondly, not to demonstrate but to give "evidence"
or "evidences" for the existence and attributes of God, and
the certainty of one's knowledge of God. We should not try
to demonstrate the finality of the Christian awareness of God
but rather (at the least) to show that it is not unreasonable or
(at the most) show that it is highly probable. Thirdly, to
affirm that the final reference point is not open to proof or
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evidence of a kind analogous to empirical evidence given in
other instances of confirmation of knowledge (e.g.,in physical
science), but that it carries its own authentication wrapped
up within it. The knowledge of God is self-authenticating and
does not require, indeed is not patent of, more than that it
forbids us to make any attempt at authentication outside of
the awareness. What authentication there is is a PYZ'OYZ'
and
not a posteriori. There may be a divergence as to the nature of
the a priori certainty. It might be viewed as beyond doubt.
I t may be viewed as not having final and absolute certainty.
The important point for our classification is that there can be
no moving from lesser to greater certainty. Whether the
certainty is final or not there is no more final certainty to be
found concerning religious awareness than from within the
context of that awareness. For those who would not claim
absolute and final certainty would affirm that there can be no
other, but insist that there is always the element of risk.
One bets one's life there is a God and stays by the wager.
Fourthly, then there is the skeptic. There is no demonstration,
no evidence, no self-authentication. There is risk, and one had
better make the best of it. But it is a risky dive into further
meaninglessness. One cannot know, or claim to know that
knowledge of God is either certain or probable.
One might add that to these various distinctions correspond
different approaches to the task of theology, and definitions
of the relationship between faith and reason. To the first
corresponds the conception of the task of theology as to give
proofs for the existence of God. Here theology and philosophy
are one, To the second theology has the job of supplying
"evidence" for its contentions. This evidence may be either
compulsive, as it was intended by "Apologetics" or "Evidences," or corroborative of that which it points to, but which
is known apart from the rational constructions of empirical
evidence. Those who deny that it is possible to prove the
reality of God or the certainty of faith, and who thus repudiate
See n.
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the high rationalism which sought to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God, may indeed be attracted to
seeking for "evidences" which may be set forth to commend
the reality of that faith. The "prover" says : I can demonstrate
the reality of that which was not demonstrated to me by
reason. The "evidencer" says: I can commend on grounds
other than those by which I was convinced the reality of that
of which I am certain. Then there are those whose appeal is
to the self-authentication of awareness of God. While the
certainty of reason and logic are contrasted toto cue20 with the
certainty of knowledge of God, reason may be given a status
both in preparing for religious awareness and in commending
it, or it may be simply denied any appropriate place in the
declaration of faith. To the fourth corresponds the reasoning
of the radicals which is not really to be classified as theology
a t all.
To get at the heart of the matter we shall distinguish
between experience and expression. When what is experienced
is expressed in the logical forms of the linguistic medium
a transposition takes place. A loss is sustained. Only confusion
results from considering the expression as if it were the reality
which it is expressing. It is possible that one may focus only
upon the expression, and, finding all manner of logical pitfalls
with it, be led to repudiate the reality which is being expressed
thereby. If one overlooks the possibility that the experience
might be the only and final court of appeal, the expression will
have to be considered only on the basis of the canons of logic
and rationality, that is to say in reference to what is other
than that which it claims to describe. That is why the a f i y i o ~ i
restricting to empirical realities of statements purporting to
refer to non-empirical realities is bound to misunderstand
those non-empirical statements. A "protocol-statement is a
translation which may very well render the original
unavailable.
Can we say anything meaningful about God to those for
whom the meaningfulness of God is not already evident (to
"
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use a pun) ? To speak about the manner in which language is
used is not necessarily identical with speaking about the
reality apprehended in religious awareness. If such reality is
unknown to the one who approaches the words, purportedly
about it, they will either be strictly meaningless, or they will
be made to point in another direction, that is to say the expression which is of experience a will be read in the light of
experience b, Much that is of use to the theologian may come
to light if this is done, but he will in the last analysis have to
object to it as needlessly restrictive and refuse its limits upon
his endeavors. He will have to say, "If that is all you think
that I mean by what you interpret me to say, you will have
misconstrued what I take the referent, the experienced reality,
to be, or what I know the experience to mean."
The theologian does not use a language different from that
which his fellows speak. He has no special language of his
own. His usage may be different, but the language is not itself
different. He employs the same kinds of constructions, indeed
even the same words. So parallels may (and should) be drawn
between the language. Parallels, some closer and some more
remote, may be found to the usage of language by the religious.
Bzd, and this is the nub of the matter, parallels only indicate
what is like, not what is unlike. To point to the analogies
between ordinary language usage and the language usage of the
religious man still leaves open the problem of the referent of
the theologian's language, and its validity. Suppose we speak
of discernment-commitment situations of which certain
language is specially significant, shall we indeed have done
anything more than to have indicated that "knowledge
about" the situation is communicable in "I-It" terms ? These
I-It terms may be translated and made to refer to existential
situations which cannot be identified with the one most
important situation they originally purported to describe.
Why should talk, for example, about "cosmic disclosure" be
readily identified with talk about God ? The "evidence" which
is here presented is a particular kind of talk about particular
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kinds of situations. These situation-responses are then made
analogous to responses to what is the unique situation of the
disclosure of God. In the name of empirical reference meaningfulness has been found which does not lead to further knowledge of the referent of such language usage. This referent still
remains hidden. As symbolic language pointing to the ultimate, at least for him who is certain of the "encounter" with
what stands ultimately over against him-God-,
will not such
language be bound to be misconstrued as pointing to something
more proximate, and its usage as a consequence be only
partially understood, analogically understood? When a
symbol (e.g., spirit), is claimed to be drawn from an immediate,
self-authenticating awareness of God, and is explained in
terms of some reality or discernment-situation other than the
one from which it rose (and by definition all else is other), will
not its intended significance, when made to point to what is
other than God, be quite effectually devaluated in the process
of commending itself ? The appeal to the evidential value of
the symbol is in terms of a particular kind of human
experience, "empirical" if you will, which particular kind of
human experience is made analogous, for the purpose of getting
the benefit of analogous predication, with the experience of the
ultimate. The appeal is as follows: you know that a discernment-situation is spoken of meaningfully in rather plain terms
in the usage of language; experience of God is a discernmentsituation, the language which is used to describe it is meaningfully used. Thus it cannot be said that religious language is
meaningless since it has such clear parallels in language which
describes experiences which no one denies. The suggestion is
tacitly made that meaningful religious language may indeed
point to truth.
A symbol has meaning in terms of experience, the limits of
which set bounds to the meaningfulness of symbolism. So in a
"desacralized cosmos" many once-potent symbols have lost
their power to point. The limits of experience set limits to
meaningful usage of language. That is why in the discussion
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of the meaning of the term "God" nothing can be assumed at
the outset. If we start with the proposition "let God be x , ~
we then wait to see how, in the particular discussion, the u,,
known gets filledwith meaning. For x could be given meanings
9, q, or r, as the experience of the individual was interpreted
in a particular way, and its significance presented in the light of
that experience. (In Kant, for example, the symbol x, a
postulate, stands in the first critique and the second for two
realities. Starting with a particular interpretation of e . g ,
rational experience, that is scientific reason, the term ''God0
is given different connotation from that which it is given when
the experience is that of moral awareness.) We have seriously
to reckon with the fact that the term "God" is nothing more
than aflatus vocis for many of our contemporaries. The symbols
by which the theist points may have different kinds of meaning
for the non-believer. The latter may make something of them
but that may not be what was intended. The believer may
communciate with fellow-believer through the use of symbols.
The process is one of "indirect communication" since both of
them know the reality to which the symbols employed point.
Thus a meeting-point is provided by the use of symbols
pointing to the same reality, and thus making possible a
community between two persons who both know that reality.
The difference between the believer and the non-believer is
that the former has at least one more connotation of the term
"God" than the latter. Thus the symbol "God," if it is at all
meaningful, will indicate a reality which is known. The
believer has many uses of the term "GodJ9in his vocabulary.
many of which may overlap with those of the non-believer. He
has one however which does not overlap at all. The meaning
of that symbol "God" can only be known as the reality to
which it points is disclosed. Otherwise it remains emptySince the theist claims that the reality "God" whom he says
' he knows is a living reality (the analogy of life being another
difficult one to add to the arsenal), he is aware that in the
usage of his pointers, his symbols, he cannot achieve a direct
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communication. Moreover the theist says that his symbols
serve to indicate a reality that may make itself present through
them. In this sense words become "Word." Within the context of "Word," such employment of symbols will then make
a community of fellowship possible, not on the level of intellectual understanding of the language involved (for that
may well be very paradoxical employment), but rather in
pointing back to the reference which both parties know from
the a #riori awareness of which we have spoken. Genuine
symbols are thus bonds of union between those who together
participate in the meaningfulness to which they point.
To appeal to "evidence" for the meaningfulness of one's
expressions one hopes that such an appeal will make more
plausible the claim that God who is known is the reality He is
known to be. Our language is meaningful ; we give evidence to
show that it is; the evidence turns out to be based upon
analogies, which evidential appeal evidently assumes the
validity of analogical predication. We have shown, we believe,
that the claim that our language is meaningful is not the same
as the claim that we know God. Moreover, the claim that
religious language is meaningful is based upon canons of meaning
which may be appropriate in certain realms of discourse but
not in others.
It is to be clearly understood that the basis for the employment of analogy is in the fact that something has been
experienced. The procedure of analogical predication cannot
be employed to establish that basis. I t is assumed. Thus the
desire for an empirical reference point for the grourzdbg of
religious awareness is a misplaced one. The ground is given,
the reference point for theological discussion is given. Talk
about, reasoning about, the significance of religious awareness
is incomprehensible apart from the givenness of that awareness. Awareness is a priori. Language, "evidence" is a flosterior;. It is obviously impossible to ground the validity of
religious awareness in what is a posteriori to it.
We have intimations that our certainties of ordinary life
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are not misplaced on the basis of "evidence" and we then
attempt to speak univocally of evidence as relevant to our
awareness of God and transcendent realities (La., realities
which transcend ordinary experience). We may say, for
example, that the love of a friend which is in doubt may be
checked by his faithfulness in communicating to us, even when
it is difficult for him to do so, that such communication will
be in accord with our particular circumstances and needs. He
will not communicate pity when there has been a manifestation
of what we thought was courage. He will not be silent when
there is genuine need. This is the way in which "evidenceJ' is
brought to bear on the problem of the friend's faithfulness.
The analogy then runs: If God loves you, there will be similar
things to which you can appeal as evidence. The crux of the
problem is whether we seek for evidence of that of which there
is uncertainty, or whether we point to the certainty which we
know by the examples which we set forth. If the former, then
we must be prepared to defend the employment of the analogical usage of the idea of evidence in connection with religious
awareness. To make a one-to-one co-ordination between
awareness of that to which evidence is applicable in empirical
experience, and awareness of what we may call God is, to say
the least, a procedure which calls for justification by the one
who makes it. I t rests upon the failure to recognize that such
empirical appeal-to "evidence"-is analogical, not univocal.
I t may indeed be equivocal. The problem to be faced is whether
the term "evidence," "appeal to empirical reference," when
used within the religious frame of reference, is in any sense
analogical. This is the least that must be done by those who
employ this kind of approach to the problem of religious
certainty.
A point of contact between those who appeal to evidence in
the manner of the scientific method to establish religious
certainty and those who say religious certainty is a priori may
be said to be found in the fact that in both cases, whether a
priori or a posteriori, the certainty is experienced. For indeed
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in the appeal to scientific evidence one has to "seeJ) that the
evidence is evidence and therefore able to produce certainty:
that is to say, there is at some point an appeal to an intuitive
grasp of the situation. This indeed may be admitted but it
does not touch our basic contention that in the case of the
theist this "grasp,') his intuitive certainty, precedes any such
attempt to commend i t ; it is a firiori, whereas the intuitive
grasp in scientific procedure is a means to bring the inquirer
(who is in doubt as to the outcome) to a certainty not presupposed and otherwise unobtainable.
The appeal to immediacy is used in quite a different context
in the two cases and thus no real analogy exists between
them. Moreover the theist in appealing to experience from
initial certainty (prior experience) is not seeking for confirmation or discomfirmation but rather for a way of expressing,
perhaps commending, that which he knows as certain from the
outset.
Is not the fact that one appeals to evidence already an admission that the reality for which evidence is sought is less
certainly known than that evidence which is called in to help
out that lack of certainty? Evidence is required for that of
which we are in doubt. To speak of presenting evidence as the
resting place for our faith, or as the means by which another
may come to faith, is to point away from that which is the
object of faith.
I t may be said that there is an ambiguity in the usage of the
term "evidence," that the expression is employed of commendation where there is no doubt on the part of the one who
makes it. That this is a possible usage of the term we would
not wish to dispute. All we are concerned to point out is that
evidence is directed against somebody's doubt, and is only to
be understood against a background of antecedent or concomitant doubt. Thus if the subject is in doubt concerning the
validity of an hypothesis or of an experience, he will seek to
confirm himself in assurance of its truth by seeking for evidence. He may not be in doubt, but have to confront the doubt of
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another. This he may seek to do by appealing to "evidence."
We have been contending that the procedure is misdirected,
that it is a t best an appeal from religious awareness to what
is transposed from it. If it is the other who is in doubt, there
may be a similar appealing to evidence in the attempt to
share the truth-certainty of the awareness which the subject
has known. But appeal to evidence is in either case a substitute for the reality, and can never produce the desired
certainty.
It is a well-known, and well-worn problem of logic and of
law, to determine what constitutes evidence for a particular
claim. How may the decision be made as to what constitutes
evidence in any particular instance ? In the nature of the case
it has to be seen that the evidence is relevant to, very relevant
to, indeed of utmost relevance to, that for which it purports to
be evidence. At some point there must be an appeal away
from the co-ordination of what is said to be evidence and
that-for-which-evidence-is-evidence to the insight, the intuition, that this is so, that it is actually "evidence." One sees
this or one does not. Appeal is made to an intuition which
may not be further questioned. One cannot after all keep on
continuously appealing to the reliability of evidence without
the process going on ad i.nfinitum, and thus opening up an
infinite regress. There must be a stopping point for which no
evidence can be given that evidence is relevant. To contend
that b and c constitute evidence for a is to affirm a priori that
a relationship exists between them, a relationship of a particular kind, a relationship moreover which is set into sharper
relief by the "evidence" now forthcoming. How does one
know that ? Not by a process of appealing to further evidence
but by appealing away from further evidence, that is on the
basis of an insight that it is so.
We have contended that the desire for an empirical reference
point to provide us with religious certainty is misplaced. The
best that evidence can establish is the high probability of a
certain fact. The piling up of evidence, relevant to the particu-
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lar matter to be proved, can a t best bring one to a high degree
of probability but this never quite reaches certainty. Even if
the certainty is virtual it is never real. The Christian has never
been content with a probable God, even if the probability be
extremely high. At least one must recognize that the implication of appealing to evidence is that the a priori certainty is
insufficient, and the appeal is thus a parley with skepticism.
If one construes the truths of religion as parallel to the
truths of science it is not only natural but inevitable that
empirical reference be essayed. Since, by a process of appeal
to evidence provided by test situations which he arranges as
best he knows, or by active observation, the scientist appears
to validate his assumptions about the structure of things,
there should be some parallel kind of validation for the claims
which the theologian makes about reality. So runs the argument, but there is a most important distinction between the
approaches of the scientist and the theologian. The former
starts with initial uncertainty about certain aspects of reality,
even if he shelves his uncertainty with a brash hypothesis that
it must be of a certain kind and viewed in a certain way.
Within the context of a reality assumed to be of a particular
kind, e.g., as described by Newton or by Einstein, he then
proposes hypotheses which, within the kind of reality assumed,
can be checked, and so validated or invalidated by appeal to
empirical evidence. The question for which the scientist assumes the answer is that the cosmos is structured in a certain
way. Within the limits of this assumption he then sets forth
his hypotheses to be proved or disproved according to what
he reckons as evidence for them.
Now the question upon which the theologian focuses is that
of the reality of God. He does not assume this, but knows it.
He does not set it forth as an hypothesis to be confirmed by
the finding of evidence. Rather he explicates what he knows
to be certain. In this his view of reason is opposed to that of
the scientist. He does not set forth with the conjecture that it
is the ultimate reality that he has known, and then seek a
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confirmation of this. Rather he knows and then moves to
make whatever explanations he does about the rest of reality
on the basis of his certainty. Now it is important to distinguish
between the two levels of which we have previously spoken.
When he speaks abozlt his religious awareness, the transposition
which has taken place from immediate awareness to speech
involves that his certainty be expressed in two ways: direct
witness, "the immediate utterances of faith," and argumentative exposition. It is in the latter that the immediate
certainty of faith becomes transposed into the suggestiveness
and probabilities of reasoning. The theologian's aim is to transfer, to the best of his ability, to the rational level the certainty which he has known on the experiential level. If he is
asked for "evidence" it is in reference to that which he knows,
not with a high degree of probability, but of which he is
certain. It is obvious that he will be asked for evidence of
what he knows by one who doubts the validity of his knowledge. The "evidenceJ) which the theologian may be called to
give, and which certain of his brood are willing to supply, is
for the purpose of commending the certainty which he knows
in face of questions which are raised. That is why there was a
department of theology once called "Evidences." "Evidences"
served in the minds of those who employed it to corroborate
what was known, and then to commend that knowledge and
its object in face of criticism and doubt.
What then is to be the theologian's response when he is
called to validate the context within which his claims are
being made ? The evidence of the scientist is gathered for the
discovery and establishment of facts within a particular
context which he has assumed. The validity of assuming
that context is left unquestioned by the scientist qzla scientist.
Philosophy of science, in part, concerns itself with the examination of the scientist's assumptions. But philosophy is not
science. When revolutions take place within the realm of
science a new conceiving of the context may become necessary.
Thus Copernicus replaces Ptolemy, and Einstein replaces
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Newton. For the sake of his researches, the working scientist
assumes that the universe is structured in such a way that his
methods of discovery are appropriate. This he does not
further question. The appIication of his method assumes its
applicability within this context. This assumption of its
applicability involves an acceptance of the structure without
its being further examined. Where such an examination is
conducted in the interest of science, it is made by the philosopher of science, who is driven from data discovered within a
theory of the structure assumed as valid to a re-assessment of
the adequacy of that theory. The scientist qzta scientist is not
primarily concerned about structure. The theologian is. Now
the scientist, in the voice of certain scientistic philosophers,
asks the theologian to provide evidence analogous to, or
univocal with his own, when the objects of concern are quite
different. It is obvious that "evidence," even when it is allowed
by certain theologians, must have quite a different meaning
in the theological vocabulary from that usage given it by the
empirical analyst of language or the scientist. What we have
called into question is the procedure on the part of the theologian of appealing to such evidence in the attempt to make
more certain that than which nothing can be more certain.
Anselm's critics tried to supplement his approach by appealing
to such evidence. Thomas, while assuming the ontological
argument, began with the "evidenceJ' of the senses and
moved from this to a "proof" of the reality of a certain kind
of God. That the procedure of appealing to empirical foundations or evidence for faith is for the theologian a barren one
when evidence is construed in terms of sense perception has
become obvious from the discussions with the logical positivists. Their restrictive criterion far the usage of reason made
it obvious that the theologian had to assert that the approach
was quite inadequate to permit him to say what he had to
say about God,
When asked for evidence to verify in empirical terms the
claim that "God loves us as a Father loves his children," the
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theist is driven to qualify the meaning of the terms as they
are used in ordinary parlance. Then they continue to be qualified so that their usage becomes so different from its ordinary
employment that the assertion is reduced from its original
brashness to meaninglessness in terms of empirical canom.
If an assertion is either false or true, it should be possible to
cite empirical evidence for or against it: if not for it then at
least against it. But a statement which cannot be verified by
empirical means cannot be so falsified either. So ran the argument. The logical positivists showed us the uniqueness of
theological statements, as well as their own needlessly
restrictive definition of reason. Their queries point up the
assertion made previously that the call for evidence is a
skeptical one. I t demands that we establish with greater
certainty that which is at present of lesser certainty or quite
in doubt. While this may be necessary for the scientist who
does not know at the outset whether his conjectured hypotheses are even plausible until he tests them in an empirical
situation, it is quite unnecessary for the theologian whose
2 The term "empirical" is a most misleading one. Basically it
means "having reference to experience." So in defining it, one introduces another term, which because of the variety of reference it may
have, needs itself defining with greater specificity to be a t all useful.
In a sense all our knowledge is empirical since it is we who have it, and
it is thus within the limits of our experience. This gets us only to the
place where we must deny an exaggerated objectivism, which is in fact
self-contradictory in any case. In the particular instance of this text
it means "having reference to sense-experience," which reference can
act as confirmation, its possible absence as disconfirmation. The term
"empirical" is used theologically of those writers whose methodological procedure requires an appeal to "experience" as opposed for
example to reason, or authority (viewed in some objectivistic manner),
as the means for theistic discussion. The attempt is made to isolate,
analyze, describe that particular religious dimension of experience, and
then to draw out its implications for discussion of God. Appeal to
reason, or to authority are not uniquely religious, even if they are
"experiences." Theological empiricism is the appeal to the known and
unique reality of faith. Since "evidence" relates to "experience" the
definition of "experience," that is of the "empirical," will determine
what kind of "evidence" is admitted as valid, whether the appeal will
be made to it, or from it.
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certainty a t the outset in his relationship with God is unquestioned. To read one discipline in the light of the other
and to dictate the procedures of theological endeavor on
the basis of scientific methodology is unwarranted and
misleading.
I t should be clear that our case is directed against a
particular construing of the meaning of "evidence." If we
seek an analogy for the appeal of the theist we may find it in
that type of "evidence" which the witness is called to give in
a law-court. This "evidenceJ' concerns that which has been
immediately experienced by him. Anything other than this is
ruled out as out of order. He may only speak that which he
has known by having immediately experienced it. What he
has known must of necessity have antecedence and priority
to that which he speaks.
This does not mean that we deny reason a place in the
theological enterprise. I t is not a matter of "either proof or
silence." One may point rather than prove. To the mysteries
of Christian faith it is very often amost complicated procedure
to point. But the pointing, while it may be very direct and
compulsive, does not provide the same compulsiveness as that
of proof, or the appeal to "evidence." The pointing can be
said to be compulsive only after the reality to which it points
has become known. The term "compulsiveness" points to the
experience of the empiricist who, even if he does not incline
a t the outset to the conjecture proposed, may indeed have to
bow to the "facts" which come to light in the process of investigation. The initial uncertainty is overcome. The theist's
certainty is a priori. The scientist's certainty is a posteriori.
So the theist's talk about religious awareness can only indicate
the direction in which to look, and the places where not to
look. The theist's talk is explication, not experimentation. I t
is report about what is known, not report about what is
coming to be known,
The term "evidence" is rejected in the sense used hitherto.
There is, nevertheless, a way in which it has obviously impor-
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tant currency in English and in which it may be fruitfully
employed of religious knowledge. If we say that religious
knowledge is "self-evident," we indicate an appeal to evidence,
but in this case the evidence is internal to the apprehending
self, as that self is in relation to the ground which is apart
from and stands over against it. I t is the self-evidence of
knowing that one is in relationship to the not-self. The analogy
has shifted from that of establishing of probable conclusions
about a conjecture on the basis of the empirically verifiable
evidence, rather to that of the speaking of the response of
person to person. This kind of "knowingJ' is what is presented
in the Scriptural account of certainty of God. The shift is a
vital one, the knowledge less easy to manipulate, the theological task to be quite differently construed in consequence. The
claim is made that to construe worthy knowledge only in
terms of the empirical method is needlessly to restrict it.
Religious knowledge is more like the knowledge that trust in
another person makes available than the knowledge that comes
from an empirical process. What has here been said about the
a p ~ i o r inature of the religious awareness, is differently expounded in the various theological traditions. But our formula "from initial certainty, through a process of transposition, to rational explication" could serve as a definition of
theology which might be applied to different schools of
theology, e.g., the mystical tradition, the Thomist way,
liberals, Barth. In each of these cases there is an initial
immediacy of awareness (defined differently indeed), and
Since the form in which we have been expounding theistic certainty in this paper has been philosophical, the question may well be
raised as to what can guarantee the certainty of the knowledge here
treated against subjectivity. This article has had the limited purpose
of setting forth thereligious certainty of the theist as a given in relation
to its subsequent elaborations. Thus we have not examined the means
by which this certainty comes to be. In discussing this latter we would
have to raise and address ourselves to the problem of the relation
between rational, historical, and experiential certainty. We would then
find ourselves in the midst of a discussion of the relationship between
faith and history.
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following this the explication in rational terms of that
awareness. 4
4 In this description of the process by which theological statements
come to be made ("from initial certainty, through a process of transposition, to rational explicationJ'p. 1g8),as in the article as a whole, it
has not been our concern to discuss the important issue of the historical
source of the revelation which, for the Christian theist, constitutes the
point of departure. I t may suffice to point out that when a reality is
manifested through history, that is through happening, we must give
attention to all the relevant questions that may be raised relative to
historical knowledge and historical evidence, after having shown that
such considerations are relevant to the kind of knowledge which we
have here expounded. The methods of the historian, can take us only
so far-to the having-happenedness of certain things. The question
that must further be raised is "What is disclosed through such havinghappenedness ?" The Christian answer to this question has been a
trinitarian one. What was disclosed then and there in the first century
of our era, is continuous, indeed in unity with, what is disclosed here
and now in the experience of the believer. To stress this continuity
between past and present, history that took place and history that
takes place, is what is intended by a doctrine of the Spirit. One can
only see the inner side of the event established by historical methods
(e.g., the death on the Cross) as the reality disclosed there ("God was
in Christ") is now manifest and whose manifestation produces the
certainty of which we have been speaking. This certainty is thus tied
to historical event. While knowledge of the Crucifixion of Jesus is not
identical with faith in the Christ who was crucified-indeed pagan
historians chronicled the crucifixion-there must be no dichotomy
between the two kinds of knowledge. That certain things happened
was in fact confessed from the outset of the church's history as
integral to faith and to the witness to faith. The decision of faith did
not take place in a vacuum but within the context of an historical
frame of reference. I t still does.

